Given these characteristics, we can consider social contract theories as a general schematic form. Social contract theories are a model of justification that has several general parameters that are defined differently in different theories. What distinguishes contractary theories is how they specify these general parameters. The purpose of the model is to describe the reasons why we support and adhere to a set of rules, principles or social institutions. This is done by showing that some representatives of the model choose who would accept these rules in a particular selection situation. Basically, there are two relevant groups of people (me and me*). The first set is the model selection device (I), which is built in the “representation device” as in the original position. The second group consists of real individuals (I*), whose conditions of interaction must be based on the contract. For the opinion of the contractors (I) to be relevant to the actual participants (I*), the arguments of the former must be shared in some way by the latter. Another variable is deliberative attitude (M), in which model (I) supports certain principles or rules, principles or institutions (R). In light of all this, we can identify a general pattern of social contract theories: the social contract is therefore a model of rational justification that translates the problem of justification (what reasons individuals have) into a problem of consideration (what rules they will accept).

As Rawls argues, while governments logically exist and must establish logical rules to ensure the security of their citizens and effectively fulfill their desires, and while in the modern era citizens must follow logical rules and question arbitrary rules, it is wrong to say that there is a direct and lasting contract between government and citizen, or that the latter will always have a responsibility, in which they can participate. or be aware of the processes of the former. There will be a future in which technology logically prevails in place of humans – autonomously, effectively and without the need for conscious attention or work from citizens. In multi-level contract theories such as that of Buchanan (2000 [1975] and Michael Moehler (forthcoming), each stage has its own unique purpose. In Buchanan`s theory, the purpose of the constitutional scene is a system of constraints that allows individuals to coexist peacefully, what Buchanan calls the “protective state” (2000 [1975]). According to him, the state of nature is characterized by both theft and defense. The ability to engage in productive enterprises is diminished due to the need to defend the fruits of these enterprises against those who would rely on predators rather than production. We all have reasons to unite, Buchanan said, to increase everyone`s overall ability to produce by limiting the need for defense, limiting the ability to engage in raids. Once the resolution of the predator-production conflict is resolved by the Constitutional Treaty, members of society also realize that if everyone contributed to the production of various public goods, the productive possibility of society would also be increased.

This second phase, post-constitutional, includes what Buchanan calls the “productive state.” Each phase is logically different, although there are causal relationships between the changes made in one phase and the effectiveness and stability of the solution in the later phase. The distinction between the two stages is analogous to the traditional distinction between commutative and distributive justice. Although these two elements are often interconnected in contemporary contract theory, one of Buchanan`s new contributions is to point out that there are theoretical advantages to separating these different objects of agreement. Rousseau also analyses the statutes in terms of risk management[17], proposing the origins of the State as a form of mutual insurance. The main procedural approach to bargaining stems from the influential work of Rubinstein (1982) and his evidence that it is possible to show that an alternating bid-negotiation process will produce the same result as Nash`s axiomatic solution in some cases. This result gave life to Nash`s (1950) early observation that haggling and bargaining rules must be the result of uncooperative play, with the idea that it might be possible to combine negotiation theory and game theory. This approach, called the nash program, is mainly advocated by Binmore (1998), whose evolutionary approach to the social contract is based on biological evolution (the game of life) to create the basic conditions for bargaining (the game of morality). Both can be modeled as non-cooperative games and the second can be modeled as a trading problem. With this approach, Binmore (1998, 2005) claims to be able to show robustly and indisputably that something like Rawls` “Justice as Fairness” will be the result of this evolutionary negotiation process.

Given the long-standing and widespread influence that the theory of social contracts has had, it is not surprising that it is also the subject of much criticism from various philosophical perspectives. Feminists and race-conscious philosophers in particular have advanced important arguments about the substance and feasibility of social contract theory. What is the social contract? An agreement between the citizen and the government? No, it would only mean the continuation of [Rousseau`s] idea. The social contract is an agreement between man and man; an agreement from which what we call society must result. In this is the concept of commutative justice, first put forward by the primitive fact of exchange. is replaced by that of distributive justice. If you translate these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is, in its highest sense, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers and renounce any claim to govern each other. The basic idea seems simple: in a way, the agreement of all individuals subject to collectively applied social agreements shows that these agreements have normative property (they are legitimate, just, binding, etc.). But even this basic idea is anything but simple, and even this abstract reproduction is reprehensible in many ways. Rawls` emphasis on equity within social contract theory gives rise to more feminist approaches, such as that of Jean Hampton.

In addition to criticizing Hobbes` theory, Hampton offers another feminist perspective that focuses on extending the effects of the social contract to interpersonal relationships. The statutes consist of two main elements. The first is an initial pre-political situation, called by modern philosophers the “state of nature” and the “original position” of Rawls, the most important contemporary representative of social contract theory. In this initial situation, all individuals are equal, they are all arranged symmetrically to each other, and they all have some incentive to leave the initial situation in favor of a relative advantage obtained by entering civil society. The second element is a normative characterization of the Contracting Parties. The parties are described as (1) motivated by their own interest, insofar as they only accept the contract if they believe that they will benefit from the social interaction; (2) are concerned about the well-being of others, if only because they recognize that the benefits they expect from the social contract are subordinate to their desire to guarantee the same benefits to their colleagues; and (3) rationally or reasonably with respect to their understanding of their own interests, the interests of others, and the just or moral principles that should govern their pursuit of those interests. The problem with balance solutions is that, as in deer hunting, many games have multiple balances. The problem then is how to choose a single equilibrium from a number of possible equilibria. The problem is exacerbated by controversies over the concepts of equilibrium refinement (see Harsanyi and Selten 1988).

Many refinements have been proposed, but as in the theory of negotiation, all of them are controversial to some extent. One of the interesting developments in social contract theory, led by game theorists such as Skyrms and Binmore, is the call for evolutionary game theory as a means of solving the problem of commentary and equilibrium selection (Vanderschraaf 2005). What cannot be solved by invoking reason (because there is simply no specific solution) can be solved by repeated interactions between rational parties. The work of theorists like Skyrms and Binmore also blurs the line between justification and explanation. Their analyses highlight both the problem of justification – what are the characteristics of a cooperative social order that people follow freely? – as well as explaining how such orders can be carried out. For Kant, states face each other as “legal persons” that “live with and in opposition to another state in a state of natural freedom, which is itself a condition of constant war.” [6] This almost perfectly reflects Hobbes` revolutionary representation of the state of nature. And just as reason forces individuals in Hobbes` state of nature to form a kind of union under a social contract, so states are encouraged to leave their state of nature and enter a kind of union of states, which he describes as “a legal state, that is, a state of distributive justice.” [7] The exact nature of this state union remained an open question for Kant. .